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LAW, POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Mark G. Yudoj'* 
LEGISLATED LEARNING: THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE 
AMERICAN CLASSROOM. By Arthur Wise. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1979. Pp. xvii, 219. $10.95. 
Legislated Learning is a trendy book that registers high on the 
Richter scale of academic tremors over law, lawyers, and legal pro-
cess.1 It is also a very bad book. It is a pastiche of themes and eru-
dite quotations unblemished by harmonizing influences. The first 
task of a reviewer of Legislated Learning closely resembles that of a 
good editor. Before analysis may proceed, hypotheses must be dis-
tilled and then distinguished from each other. Passing references, 
inconsistent with the major themes of the book - for example a 
spanking new discussion of federalism near the end of the work (pp. 
202-03, 206-08) - need to be banished from the mind. Once the 
reader mentally edits the book to render it more comprehensible, 
four interrelated arguments emerge. These vary in persuasiveness 
from the plausible to the absurd. 
At one level, the author regurgitates much of the writing and 
thinking of Donald Horowitz2 and Nathan Glazer,3 and contends 
that courts are not competent to set education policy in the guise of 
deciding concrete disputes between parties (pp. 75-77, 118-85). To 
Wise and others, the best examples of incompetence involve con-
struction of open-textured state and federal constitutional provisions 
by the judiciary (pp. 3-6, 131-39, 155-85), though unlike Glazer, 
Wise rests his argument more on concerns about competence than 
about the legitimacy of judicial intervention. A second and related 
theme is that dispute resolution in the public schools has increasingly 
been "legalized" as educational decisions are appealed to courts or 
state administrative agencies and as legal models of dispute resolu-
• Marrs McLean Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1965, LL.B. 1968, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. - Ed. 
I. See Book Review, 5 J. EDuc. FINANCE 481 (1980). 
2. See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977). 
3. See N. GLAZER, COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (publication forthcoming); Glazer, To-
wards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 Pus. INTEREST 104 (1975); Glazer, Should Judges Administer 
Social Services?, 44 Pus. INTEREST 64 (1978). 
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tion are mandated within the schools themselves (pp. 75-77).4 Rule 
and procedure overwhelm discretion (p. 131). And ultimately this 
results ( or may result?) in the increased "bureaucratization of the 
American classroom" (the book's subtitle) and in the loss of local 
control (pp. 48-49). 
The third theme, a critique of major policy innovations of the last 
fifteen years, moves well beyond criticisms of judicial intervention 
and the adversary method of resolving disputes. Rather, it treats ju-
dicial, legislative, and administrative decision making as birds of a 
feather. Such agencies, in Wise's view, frequently express policies 
through rules and procedures, and those policies are wrongheaded 
for a variety of reasons. They may embody an unduly restrictive 
view of the goals of education, they may ignore resource limitations 
and gaps in the technology of producing educational outcomes, and 
they may overlook distortions introduced through bureaucratic im-
plementation (pp. 55-61). Most importantly, in pressing for equal 
educational outcomes for various groups of children, policymakers 
have increasingly moved well beyond specification of inputs and 
procedures. The result is that many policies fail. 
Wise argues that the problem lies with "a legalistic conception of 
education and the school" (p. 52). Repeal of bad legislation or the 
overturning of bad court decisions will not suffice because the flaw 
lies in the ways that politicians, policymakers, and judges think 
about the world. Legal rationality is but one example of a rational 
model, and the author believes that rational models (be they eco-
nomic, scientific, organizational, or whatever) are often misguided 
(p. 79). Rationality too often leads to "hyperrationalization" (pp. 47-
48), a goal-oriented consideration of the fit between means and ends 
that produces "logical" solutions that are not firmly rooted in reality 
(pp. 65-66, 115). Put simply, the mind of the decision maker super-
imposes rational schemes on disorderly educational organizations 
and on the subtle and complex art of teaching (pp. 78-103). 
The incompetence theme is primarily taken up in chapter four. 
Wise relies extensively on Donald Horowitz's book, The Courts and 
Social Policy5 (pp. 120-26). The research is rather one-sided, with 
no references to scholars like Abram Chayes6 or Laurence Tribe7 
4. See Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: .Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. 
L. REV. 841, 851-59 (1976); Yudof, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Justice: .Due Process, 
Bureaucracy, and the Public Schools, in FUTURE TRENDS IN EDUCATION POLICY 109 (J. 
Newitt, ed. 1978). 
5. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 255-98. 
6. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976). 
7. See, e.g. , Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In .Defense of the Adversary Process -A ~eply 
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who defend judicial involvement in complex institutional litigation.8 
Wise finds courts incompetent for a number of reasons. Courts are 
charged with making decisions and creating policy in the absence of 
information about the workings of educational institutions and the 
likely consequences of intervention (p. 121). Courts are too rational-
istic, too insensitive to rough-and-tumble politics, and too bound to 
theories of rights. The piecemeal character of litigation (p. 123), the 
tendency to eschew compromise (p. 121), the necessity of narrowing 
issues and goals (pp. 123-24), the difficulty of relying upon social-
science evidence (pp. 145-46), and the focus on the extreme cases for 
general rules (p. 124) may lead to unreliable results. There are fewer 
participants in the judicial process than in the legislative process (pp. 
121-22), and those who do participate have an incentive to withhold 
information that would be damaging in an adversary proceeding. 
One part of the argument is that courts are less competent fact-
finders than legislatures. But for all of Wise's analysis of the New 
Jersey School Finance case (pp. 155-85) and his reliance on 
Horowitz's study of Hobson v. Hansen 9 (pp. 135-39), he only suc-
ceeds in showing that courts often are inept fact-finders. Whether 
legislatures are less inept is a different question, a largely empirical 
one which cannot be answered with polemical assertions. 10 A recent 
study by Michael Rebell and Arthur Block, comparing legislative 
and judicial processes in the education field, found that issues fre-
quently were more thoroughly and intelligently discussed in the judi-
cial forum. 11 Legislative hearings tended to be ritualistic as 
proponents and opponents of the bill called their witnesses. The cal-
iber of testimony in judicial proceedings, while hardly overwhelm-
ing, tended to be better because more witnesses were called and 
because the witnesses were more carefully questioned. For the very 
reason that courts tend to be more rationalistic and less oriented to-
ward politics (a point Wise makes), one might well expect that courts 
would more thoroughly air factual issues. And as Abram Chayes 
lo Justice Rehnquist, 33 MIAMI L. REV. 43 (1978). 
8. See Kirp, School Desegregation and the Limits ef Legalism, 47 PUB. INTEREST 101, 122-
25 (1977). 
9. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), ajfd en bane sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 
(D.C. Cir. 1969). See Hobson v. Hansen (Hobson II), 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971). See 
generally Michelson, For the Plaint!lft- Equal School Resource A/location, 7 J. HUMAN RE-
SOURCES 283 (1972); O'Neill, Gray & Horowitz, For the Defendants - Educational Equali(i• 
and Expenditure Equalization Orders, 7 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 307 (1972). 
10. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1304-16. 
11. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE COURTS (publi-
cation forthcoming). 
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has noted, modem courts in public interest litigation are not as lim-
ited by rules of evidence and other devices in their fact-finding as 
they were in the past. 12 Of course, to say that courts are equally or 
more competent fact finders than legislatures is not to say that they 
should be entrusted with public policy decisions. But Wise's point is 
largely limited to judicial competence, and he ignores the question of 
whether it is legitimate for courts to make decisions premised on 
"legislative" facts. 
A second branch of Wise's competency argument is that courts 
must and should justify their decisions in terms of legal authority. 
This means that courts may deduce educational solutions from laws 
and precedents while ignoring the realities of the situation (pp. 75-
76, 122-24): "In interpreting laws as a means of solving educational 
problems, the courts focus on explicit . . . phenomena, on formal 
rather than informal structure, on rationale rather than reality" (p. 
122). 
In large measure, this point is well taken. There is always the 
danger that judges will craft decisions that meet the highest stan-
dards of legal justification, but will reach uncommonly silly results. 
But Wise sweeps far too broadly. If a court is construing a statute 
and it employs reasonable means to discern the legislative purpose, 
what more should one expect? The solution is properly deduced 
from the law, and if the result is awkward, the legislature should 
change the law. More to the point, Wise's observations fly in the 
face of the legal realism of the last fifty years. The problem may be 
more that a court can manipulate constitutional and statutory text 
and precedents to reach a solution that it believes is wise, than it is 
that such authorities command an unwise s6lution. Dr. Wise is 
somewhere back in the nineteenth century in his conception of the 
formalism of the legal process;13 indeed, the formalists of that age 
may appear to be legal realists by comparison with him. And had 
Wise been more concerned with the legitimacy of judicial interven-
tion, he might have realized that it is the very lack of strictures on 
judicial decision-making that has caused critics of judicial activism 
to charge the courts with usurping legislative functions. 14 
12. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1296-98. 
13. See generally G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977); K. LLEWEL-
LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 38-41 (1960); White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elabora-
tion: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973). 
14. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST (1980); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT'! (1975); Greenawalt, i)iscretion and Judi-
cial J)ecision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 CoLUM. L. Rev. 359 
(1975); HART, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
J)ream, II GA. L. Rev. 969 (1977). 
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The third branch of the competence argument concerns the im-
plementation of remedies in complex school litigations. The argu-
ment is powerfully, if cryptically, made: 
The legal process also contains its own theories of human behavior and 
of organization. Ordering the school administrator or teacher to alter 
his behavior is deemed sufficient to induce behavioral change. When 
the order is to cease a behavior, it may work; when the order is to 
perform a behavior, it may not. Schools are assumed to be organized 
according to the Weberian ideal of hierarchical authority. [P. 76.] 
The difficulty is that Wise does not elaborate upon this promising 
theme and that he overlooks the work of Christopher Stone, 15 Wil-
liam Clune, 16 David Kirp, 17 and others18 who have thought about 
the implementation of court decisions. Familiarity with the litera-
ture would have lead to at least four additional qualifications and 
interpretations. First, in an age of complex institutional litigation, 
the law, in animistic fashion, may fail to distinguish the alteration of 
individual behavior from the alteration of institutional behavior. 
Even in the fields of contracts and torts, institutional and individual 
liability may have very different policy implications. What deters an 
individual from engaging in some behavior may not deter an organi-
zation.19 The results may be unintended and serendipitous. Second, 
the concepts of fault, individual responsibility, and choice that un-
derlie legal sanctions may become attenuated when the sanctions are 
imposed on an organization with thousands of employees, with vari-
ous roles, with no single person responsible for many decisions.20 
Third, legal sanctions may have an insignificant effect on the behav-
ior of school organizations because they appear to occur almost ran-
domly and are balanced against professionalism, bureaucratic 
demands, public pressure and the like.21 Finally - and this is an 
important point missed by the author - the nature of the judicial 
15. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE. SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
(1975). See CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE (M. Ermann & R. Lundman eds. 
1978). 
16. Clune, Wealth Discrimination In School Finance, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 651 (1973). See 
also M. FEELY, P. PIELE, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & W. CLUNE, III, Si:;HOOLS & THE COURTS 
(1979). 
17. Kirp, supra note 4; Kirp, Race, Politics and the Courts: School Desegregation in Sall 
Francisco, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 572 (1976). 
18. E.g., Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV, L. 
REV. 428 (1977). 
19. See generally C. STONE, supra note 15; Berman, The Study Of Macro- And Micro-Im-
plementation, 26 Pua. POLICY 157 (1978). 
20. See generally C. STONE, supra note 15; Elmore, Organizational Models Of Social Pro• 
gram Implementation, 26 Pua. POLICY 185 (1978). 
21. See generally S. SARASON, THE. CULTURE OF THE SCHOOL AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CHANGE. (1971); C. STONE, supra note 15. 
March 1981) Law, Policy, and Public Schools 779 
decision may be critical to the manner of its implementation. If the 
decision is relatively clear and not strongly opposed by important 
constituent groups, and if its implementation does not conflict with 
bureaucratic values, then the decision may well be implemented in 
hierarchical fashion with little deviation.22 In my own work I have 
argued that procedural requirements, for example, are more likely to 
be implemented (at least in form if not spirit) than substantive re-
quirements such as protection of student rights or abolition of school 
prayers.23 ' 
Legislated Learning's second major theme is that rules and for-
mal procedures have come to dominate public schooling in America, 
and that every substantive and procedural requirement limits "the 
discretionary performance of school officials by proscribing or pre-
scribing ends or means" (p. 131). Wise lays particular emphasis on 
the Supreme Court's Goss v. Lopez24 decision requiring an informal 
hearing for students suspended for less than ten days (p. 133). At 
this point the argument becomes more complex. If "legalization" 
refers to the tendency "to discover, construct, and follow rules,"25 the 
phenomenon is not limited to judicial interventions (p. 51 ). When 
Congress guarantees access to student records and requires hearings 
to contest alleged inaccuracies in the records,26 when state legisla-
tures enact public sector collective bargaining -laws applicable to 
teachers,27 and when school boards adopt codes of student rights and 
responsibilities,28 they are contributing as much to the legalization 
process as court decisions. Thus, Wise equates all policies embodied 
in rules and regulations with the process of legalization (p. 61 ). And 
thus all hierarchically imposed policies, not just court decisions, re-
strict the autonomy of school teachers and administrators. This ar-
gument has clear implications for democratic constraints on public 
22. See Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority, and Organizational 
Theory: Implementing Due Process far Students in the Public Schools, - Wis. L. REV. 
(1981) (in press). See generally A. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY 
(1965); S. SARASON, supra note 21. 
23. See Yudof, supra note 22. 
24. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
25. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 21 (1971) (not cited or discussed by Dr. Wise). 
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1970) (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act). 
21. See generally L. McDONNELL & A. PASCAL, ORGANIZED TEACHERS IN AMERICAN 
SCHOOLS (1979); D. WOLLETI & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTI-
ATIONS (1974). 
28. See M. CHESLER, MAINTAINING ORDER AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: THE DE-
TROIT UNIFORM CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT (1976); EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
CODES OF STUDENT DISCIPLINE AND STUDENT RIGHTS (1975). 
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schools and for the appropriate role of professionals in education. 
These implications will be discussed below. 
For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that Wise seri-
ously mischaracterizes a pervasive problem of political, organiza-
tional, and legal theory.29 He believes that the assumption 
underlying legalization is that "[r]ules and procedures are superior to 
the exercise of judgment as means to promote equal and fair treat-
ment in schools" (p. 56), and that frequently "hyperrationalization" 
results: 
Hyperrationalization occurs when conformity to norms is not achieved 
by the procedures and rules imposed - when procedures are followed 
but the norm of fairness is not necessarily attained; when rules are 
obeyed but the norm of equality is not necessarily attained. [P. 66.] 
What Wise misses is that the successful operation of any complex 
organization involves a balancing of discretion and rules. On the 
on~ hand, rules establish standards for behavior, provide guidance to 
the novice or the marginally competent, and promote uniformity of 
treatment. On the other hand, those on the firing-line ("street level 
bureaucrats" in the phrase of Weatherly and Lipsky)30 need to be 
able to exercise their best judgment in individual situations if they 
are to accomplish policy objectives. This is as true for teachers and 
school administrators as it is for police officers, social workers, and 
postal employees. Rules and discretion are complementary elements 
in the achievement of policy objectives. Identifying the equilibrium 
point is a vexing problem and the subject of considerable dispute. 
But Wise unnecessarily confounds analysis by perceiving the prob-
lem as a choice between a government of laws and a government of 
men. 
In his zealousness to demonstrate the extent of legalization in the 
schools, the author also distorts the law.31 For example, he admits 
that the Goss decision, "taken by itself, is a limited intervention into 
the affairs of a school" (p. 132). Essentially, an administrator need 
only inform the student of the alleged violation of school rules and 
listen to his or her side of the story. Indeed, Professor Kirp has ar-
gued that Goss may represent a shift away from equating due pro-
29. See, e.g., W. MOMMSEN, THE AGE OF BUREAUCRACY 99 (1974); R. POUND, AN INTRO· 
DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (1961). See general/.)• K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE (1969); T. LOW!, THE ENO OF LIBERALISM (1969); P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND 
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); J. SHKLAR, supra note 25; Weatherley & Lipsky, Street-Level Bu-
reaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform, 41 HARV, L. 
REV. 171 (1977). 
30. Weatherley & Lipsky, supra note 29. 
31. See Thurston, Book Review, 5 J. EDUC. FINANCE 481, 482 (1980). 
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cess with adversarial hearings and toward less formal dialogues in 
the resolution of school disputes.32 But Wise says that the limited 
reading of Goss "may be deceptive, since its reasoning may easily be 
extended" (p. 133). Obviously, any reading of a case may be decep-
tive; cases acquire meanings as they are reflected upon and em-
ployed as precedents. Wise, however, gives no examples of any 
extensions of Goss. He only cites language in the opinion that sus-
pensions for ten days or longer may require more demanding proce-
dures (the law of the land well before Goss)33 and a law review 
article written a year after Goss. 34 He completely ignores recent 
Supreme Court decisions limiting the definitions of property and lib-
erty interests protected by due process requirements. 35 He does dis-
cuss Board of <;urators v. Horowitz,36 but in a most disingenuous 
way. In that case the Court drew a distinction between disciplinary 
and academic suspensions, and held the due process clause inappli-
cable to the latter. Wise states that the Court found the process 
given "sufficient," and discusses the views of three justices who dis-
agreed in part with the majority (p. 135). Any lawyer worth his· or 
her salt would recognize Horowitz and the corporal punishment 
case37 as clear limitations on the reach of Goss. It is as if the author 
wrote much of the chapter on "legalizing the schools" (pp. 118-54) 
around the time of Goss, and then refused to reconsider his conclu-
sions as contrary evidence emerged. His discussion of these 
Supreme Court cases also stands as a monument to the poor quality 
oflegal research found in much of the book. The chapter could have 
been much improved had Wise referred to the standard constitu-
tional law texts and casebooks. 
The author's discussion of the impact of legalization on the class-
room is schizophrenic. Without citing any empirical evidence, he 
asserts that teachers "increasingly" have been treated as bureaucrats: 
"If schools are not performing well, they are instructed to tighten 
specific operations - a phenomenon we call 'bureaucratic rationali-
32. See Kirp, supra note 4, at 864: Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School 
Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 25. 
33. See generally Buss, Procedural Due Process far School Discipline: Probing the Constitu-
tional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (1971). 
34. Dessem, Student Due Process Rights in Academic Dismissals .from the Public Schools, 5 
J. L. & EDUC. 277 (1976). 
35. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New 
Property''.· Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative Stale, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 
(1977). 
36. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
37. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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zation.' If teachers are not performing well, they are to be precisely 
instructed on what to teach and how to teach - we call this view 
'rationalistic teaching' " (p. 81 ). "Rationalistic teaching," then, is 
clearly a cost of the legalization and bureaucratization processes. 
Wise next wishes to show that schools do not conform to rational 
bureaucratic models, and hence are not amenable to rational bu-
reaucratic reforms. In order to demonstrate this point, he reverses 
field: 
Consensus on goals is lacking. Formal power may be centralized, but 
its influence at the classroom level is attenuated. . . . Increasingly, 
analysts question whether schools are or can be closely coordinated, 
what the effects of planning are, and how interdependent the compo-
nents of school organization are. 
Teachers, of course, do not . . . readily accept a rationalistic character-
ization of their roles. . . . The rationalistic mode of thinking may be 
dissonant with the reality of teaching. Substantial evidence suggests 
that the primary reason is that the rationalistic conception of teaching 
is perceived by teachers as not salient, useful, or relevant to the de-
mands of their work. [Pp. 90, 96.] 
Thus Dr. Wise would have it both ways. Legalization and 
bureaucratization are increasingly entering the classroom, with de-
structive effects on education, and yet the rationalistic model ( of 
which legalization is a part) is ineffective because decision makers in 
the hierarchy find it difficult to reach down to the classroom level. 
The difficulty arises because of both the loose organizational nature 
of schools and the resistance of teachers to such central direction.38 
Hence legalization is a villain both because it does and does not have 
an impact on classrooms. 
Dr. Wise's third major theme, the critique of major policy inno-
vations of the last fifteen years or so, need not long detain us. The 
author is surely on secure ground in suggesting that such scientific 
management schemes as management by objectives, zero-based 
budgeting, and management information systems have not been 
great successes in the public schools (pp. 12-19). He is also correct in 
arguing that statutes and court decisions addressed to improving ed-
ucational outcomes (reading skills, good citizenship, economic self-
sufficiency, etc.) are doomed to failure given the presently indetermi-
nate relationship between educational resources and educational 
outcomes (pp. 7-12). This is particularly true ifthere is no consensus 
38. See generally Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 Ao. 
Sci. Q. I (1974); March, American Public School Administration: A Short Anal)'Sis, 86 ScH, 
REV, 217 (1978). 
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on appropriate outcomes, if those outcomes are difficult to measure, 
and if it is undesirable to treat education in such a crudely instru-
mental fashion (pp. 115-17). His critique of minimum competency 
testing legislation (pp. 24-27, 68) is particularly compelling: 
One result, and a second example of wishful thinking [the first example 
is the belief that federal compensatory education expenditures will 
boost student achievement], has been that state legislatures and state 
courts have been requiring by law specified levels of performance on 
the part of school-people and schoolchildren. Competency-based 
graduation requirements and the rulings for "thorough and efficient 
education" demand that the schools produce outcomes which they may 
not be able to achieve. [P. 68.] 
The lesson may be obvious, but perhaps Wise is correct in asserting 
that many legislatures and some courts have not learned it: a law or 
court decision cannot successfully command what it is presently im-
possible to do. So too, Wise is surely correct in suggesting that lim-
ited technology, scarcity of resources, the unnecessary narrowing of 
goals, bureaucratic structure, and limited knowledge of educational 
processes may all cut against successful policy innovations (pp. 65-
69). 
If there is a weakness in this aspect of Legislated Learning, it lies 
in Wise's hyperbolic description of the movement toward regulating 
education outcomes through law and legal processes. For example, I 
have no doubt that many of those who voted for Title I of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 196539 intended to im-
prove the educational plight of poor children and to work toward a 
breaking of the nexus between poverty and educational failure. In 
this regard the experience with title I has been far from satisfactory 
(pp. 8-12, 68). But it may be unfair to characterize title I in such a 
unidimensional fashion, for the goals of title I may have been many 
and fluid. Perhaps the Congress had in mind providing financial 
assistance to school districts with large concentrations of poor chil-
dren. Or perhaps it wished to create the opportunities for learning 
without great concern about the ultimate result. Further, title I pro-
grams are formulated by local school districts, subject to the basic 
requirement that the monies be spent on children with severe educa-
tional deficiencies. Congress did not mandate particular educational 
outcomes. Indeed, it did not even mandate particular educational 
offerings. Rather, at best, it made money available to local school 
districts to allow them to define appropriate outcomes and the means 
of achieving those outcomes. I do not think that I am quibbling over 
39. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-241k (1976 & Supp. III 1979) 
(the act has been substantially amended since 1965). 
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words in asserting that this is a far cry from the meanings that one 
typically associates with such polemical terms as "mandate[dj" (p. 3) 
and "legislated lear:ning." 
The discussion of the New Jersey school financing case, Robinson 
v. Cahil!,40 is far more persuasive. Dr. Wise makes out a strong case 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in construing the "thorough 
and efficient" education clause of the state constitution, shifted from 
an equal educational opportunity approach to an adequate achieve-
ment approach. Such judicial decisions, as I argued eight years ago, 
are wrongheaded; they do not create intelligible standards for school 
officials and they seek to accomplish what present education technol-
ogy cannot achieve.41 But Wise overstates the case by suggesting 
that cases like Robinson are the norm. Other state school financing 
cases have not taken the Robinson tack.42 And it certainly con-
founds reality to assert that "the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to 
shift concern from equality of educational opportunity to adequacy 
of educational achievement" (p. 3). The author cites Brown v. Board 
of Education 43 for this proposition (pp. 3-5). Yet there is not a shred 
of evidence in the confused desegregation cases of the 1970s to link 
racial balance remedies with a constitutionally identified goal of im-
proved student achievement.44 Perhaps the Justices hope for such a 
result, and certainly many commentators pray for it, but modern de-
segregation cases simply do not turn on concerns about educational 
outcomes.45 Wise also cites San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez ,46 a case involving a fourteenth amendment challenge 
to the Texas school financing law, as evidence of the movement to-
ward focusing on education outcomes (pp. 5-6). Yet the plaintiffs 
lost in the Supreme Court, and this reality overwhelms Wise's unper-
40. (Robinson I) 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); (Robinson II) 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 
(1975); (Robinson III) 67 N.J. 35,335 A.2d 6 (1975); (Robinson IV) 67 N.J. 333,351 A.2d 713 
(1975); (Robinson V) 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); (Robinson VI) 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 
457 (1976); (Robinson VII) 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976). 
41. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REV, 41 I, 419-34 
(1973). 
42. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); 
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615,376 A.2d 359 (1977); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 
537 P.2d 635 (1975) (relief denied); Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 
(1976) (relief denied). See generally Clune & Lindquist, Serrano and Robinson: Studies i11 the 
I mplemelllatio11 of Fiscal Equity a11d Effective Educalio11 i11 Stale Public Law Litigalio11, in M. 
FEELY, P. PIELE, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & W. CLUNE.supra note 16, at 67; Levin, Currell/ Tre11ds 
in School Fi11ance Reform Litigation: A Commelllary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099. 
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
44. See Yudof, supra note 41, at 439-44. 
45. Id. See ge11erally Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reaso11ed Elaboratio11, 
a11d Social Scie11ce Research i11 the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 57 (1978), 
46. 411 U.S. I (1973). 
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suasive discussion of dicta in the majority opinion and the views of 
the dissenters. Moreover, Wise appears to equate a concern for the 
impact of school financing laws and racial segregation on achieve-
ment with the notion of mandating particular educational processes 
and outcomes. In all of the cited decisions, this is manifestly not the 
case. 
The fourth theme of Legislated Learning, by far the most radical, 
is that virtually all forms of policymaking (Wise is unclear on this) 
are premised on rationalistic models, and that policymaking is thus 
doomed to failure. At the simplest level, Wise questions the value of 
systems of thought in resolving school problems.47 He believes that 
legal, economic, bureaucratic, professional, or other rational models 
are inadequate bases for making or implementing policy choices. A 
major reason for his skepticism is that public schools themselves do 
not operate in accordance with rational models: 
Educational policymakers behave as though they believe that schools 
operate according to the rationalistic model. That model postulates 
that schools operate by setting goals, implementing programs to 
achieve these goals, and evaluating the extent to which the goals are 
attained. The goal-oriented process is assumed to be effectuated 
through a bureaucratic distribution of formal authority and work re-
sponsibility. It is further assumed that the attainment of goals provides 
sufficient incentives to drive the system. . . . Policies which promise 
to increase productivity and equity are imposed on the existing struc-
ture of the school in the anticipation that they will improve education. 
. . . What may be wrong with the rationalistic model is that those 
who are attempting to change or control schools by reference to it are 
implicitly basing their actions on a set of assumptions that may be dif-
ferent from the assumptions, opinions, and the theories under which 
the schools actually operate. 
The failure of schools to conform to the rationalistic model may be 
seen in the failure thus far to create models which help explain the 
process of schooling empirically. [Pp. 78-79.] 
Policymakers, then, tend to impose an artificial order on a highly 
chaotic reality, and this explains why "so far, mechanisms of control 
in schools have not ensured compliance with long-range plans" (p. 
89). 
If Wise limited himself to this proposition, his thesis would be 
debatable, but still well within the bounds of current debates in 
political science. Such eminent political scientists as Aaron Wildav-
47. See A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY 
ANALYSIS (1980); Lindblom, The Scienceof"Muddling Through," 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959). 
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sky,48 Paul Peterson,49 and Charles Lindblom50 (none of whom are 
cited by the author) have vehemently warned against taking rational, 
theoretical constructs from the various disciplines and applying them 
with full force to complex organizations. Lindblom speaks of the 
"science of muddling through"5 I as perhaps the best way to view the 
behavior of people within organizations. Wildavsky prefers the mar-
ketplace and the political processes to determination by experts of 
what would be just and effective.52 But, alas, Dr. Wise goes much 
further. He does so in two respects. First, by equating all policies 
embodied in legal rules with rationalism, he suggests that even legis-
lation, the result of rough and tumble politics, is fatally flawed. 
Wildavsky and Lindblom's point is far different. They are sug-
gesting that intellectualization and expertise are to be distrusted and 
that we should rely on poltical and market processes to establish pol-
icies. Put somewhat differently, they argue that political and market 
processes are rational means of governing education, and hence they 
would object primarily to policy made by the self-declared expert in 
accordance with some model of human behavior. Thus they might 
object to judicial intervention within a constitutional framework, or 
to adminstrative intervention supposedly grounded in public admin-
istration theory, but they would not object to laws enacted by elected 
bodies pursuant to democratic principles. Second, in a sort of vul-
garized version of Horkheimer53 and Oakeshott,54 Wise also appears 
to deny the efficacy of instrumental reasoning - indeed, in contrast 
to Wildavsky, he is worried about "common sense rationality" (pp. 
69-70). Wise declares that he is concerned about a policymaking 
process that "views education as the means by which the child is 
prepared to take his place in society" (p. 106). 55 
48. See A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 47. 
49. See P. PETERSON, SCHOOL POLITICS CHICAGO STYLE 128-39 (1976). 
50. See generally C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965); Lindblom, 
supra note 47 . .But see C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977). 
51. Lindblom, supra note 47, at 88. 
52. See A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 47. 
53. See M. HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON (1947); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLI-
TICS (1975). 
54. See M. OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS (1962). For a trenchant application of 
Oakeshott's perspective to constitutional law, see Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV, 
1174 (1979). 
55. The school and the teachers are the instruments which will transform the child into a 
productive, literate, law-abiding citizen. The notions that education is important in its 
own right, that education may lead a person to challenge rather than accept society, and 
that education is a gift which society bestows upon the individual are absent from the 
instrumental view of education. . . . (A]s the influence of policymakers becomes more 
pervasive, the risk is that the instrumental goals will become the exclusive goals. 
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The vital thrust of Legislated Learning therefore is quite simple: 
The problem with public schools is that they are subject to educa-
tional policies. Presumably this message undercuts the notion that 
centralization is the evil; for even school boards, superintendents, 
and principals may be capable of formulating educational policies 
through instrumental reasoning. To govern is to err. And be aware 
that Wise, unlike Professor Tribe, is not simply warning us about the 
dangers of a rampant instrumentalism.56 Tribe worries that objec-
tive reason (instrumental means-ends analysis) tends to weed out 
soft, unquantifiable variables, to assume that the ends are static, to 
ignore the fact that means may redefine and become ends, to ignore 
interrelationships among ends, and ultimately to deter us from 
thinking about the goodness or justice of the ends themselves (sub-
jectiv~ reason). Wise, however, appears opposed to reflection;57 he is 
troubled that "[t]he pressures to solve educational problems through 
policy interventions appear unremitting" (p. 199). But what is the 
alternative to thinking about the deficiencies of public education and 
about the most efficacious ways of addressing those deficiencies? 
Wise fails to understand that people can apply reason and common 
sense to problems in the real world that are not governed by neat 
rules of some rationalistic model. Any reflection is rationalization of 
a type. The alternative, I suppose, is to go "with the flow," a substi-
tution of a secular Taoism for reflective judgments. And Wise comes 
very close to this, implying that if only there were no policy, children 
would be instilled with the desire to learn and to develop to their full 
potential. Without policy, there would be no conflict between the 
preferences of the individual and those of the group: all would be a 
part of a grand, romantic unity. Kenneth Arrow has described this 
mysticism: 
The tension between society and the individual is inevitable. . . . 
[S]ome sense of rational balancing of ends and means must be under-
stood to play a major role in our understanding of ourselves and our 
social role. Let me illustrate by presenting or, more precisely, carica-
. . . The rationalistic paradigm fails to make a place for the school as an institution for 
learning; it fails to make a place for a humanistic teacher; and it fails to provide a place 
for education conceived as self-development. 
Pp. 106, 117. 
56. See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth .Discontinuity: The Limits of Instru-
mental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973). See generally Tribe, Ways Not to Think 
about Plastic Trees: New Foundations far Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974); Tribe, 
Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHILOSOPHY & Pue. AFF. 66 (1972). 
51. q. Nagel, supra note 54, at 1183 (" 'Rational' conduct, which should not be confused 
with 'sensible' or 'efficient' conduct, is 'behavior deliberately directed to the achievement of a 
formulated purpose and governed solely by that purpose.'" (footnotes omitted)). 
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turing some thought tendencies. We have one, loosely called "the new 
Left thought," not so new perhaps. . . . Bakunin and Sorel had spo-
ken to the same point many years ago. But it is a real one. There is a 
demand for what might be termed sincerity, for a complete unity be-
tween the individual and the social roles, the notion that somehow in 
an ideal society there would be no conflict between one's demand on 
oneself and one's responses to the demands of society.58 
Wise takes us to this ideal society and away from any real society. In 
his ideal world, he substitutes consensus for authority.59 
Since Wise is not yet operating in the New Jerusalem, the impli-
cations of his analysis are profoundly undemocratic. If democracy 
requires that self-controlled citizens have the opportunity to influ-
ence policy and to select leaders, 60 then presumably elected leaders 
in Congress, in state legislatures, and on local boards of education 
should determine educational policies. Otherwise, there is no pro-
cess of consent, and the professionals are free to do what they please. 
And if this is the case, then it is of the utmost importance that elected 
officials have the ability to control or at least to direct the behavior of 
those responsible for delivering educational services. In other words, 
if elected officials cannot demand that unelected public servants be-
have in conformity with established public policy, then the electorate 
itself has lost control of the public enterprise. Wise has simply got-
ten carried away with his objections to judicial intervention and le-
galization ("legal rationality") by not distinguishing them from the 
systemic needs of any democratic order. Furthermore, he ignores 
the fact that many policies do work. Elected officials (and adminis-
trative agencies subject to legislative oversight) decide such matters 
as compulsory attendance, minimum curriculum requirements, 
grade structure, and the like. To be sure, this is a far cry from regu-
lating education outcomes. But the point is that public officials rou-
tinely set policies that are followed. It also is paradoxical that Wise 
presumably would allow government owned and operated schools to 
exist, and yet deny to the public the power to direct those schools. 
But Wise takes this position because he equates political choice and 
compromise with a mindless rationalism. 
Finally, Dr. Wise's war on rationalism would bring even more 
power to professional educators. The argument against rationalistic 
thinking is usually employed to defend the political processes from 
assaults by those who claim greater expertise: educators, lawyers, 
58. K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 15-16 (1974). 
59. See id. at 69. 
60. See D. BOORSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 10 (1974); C. FRANKEL, THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT (1962). 
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public administrators, and the like. Legislated Learning stands the 
argument on its head by using it to attack political outcomes and to 
ensure that professional educators are the effective winnets. Teach-
ers are to eschew the abstract and the oversimplified in favor of a 
concept of responsibility "for a whole, real child" (p. 97). They are 
to translate "formal goals into personalized objectives" (p. 99). 
Teachers, in short, will obliterate rampant instrumentalism and mag-
ically synthesize the interests of the social group, the parents, the 
children, and the educators. This means that the professionals 
would assume the powers that Dr. Wise would take away from the 
policy-makers. The "solution" would simply exacerbate the primary 
obstacle to improving education, which is that professionalism too 
often isolates public schools from accountability to the citizenry. As 
Cohen and Farrar have noted, 
There are real political imbalances in the governance of American 
schools, which contribute to the poor performance of political reforms 
to increase participation. But the real imbalance is not political in ori-
gin. It results more from a social division of labor that encourages the 
specialization of work, the professionalization of roles, and the parti-
tioning of authority. In advanced industrial societies this solidifies pro-
fessional power in education, as well as discouraging active parental 
involvement. ... 
. . . Professionals gain economic returns, social satisfaction, per-
sonal status, individual identity, and group power from their roles. 
And parents, most of whom have occupations providing similar re-
wards, have seen their educational role narrowed and redefined.61 
Thus the possibility of political remedies for school deficiencies is 
already remote because "the imbalance in school power does not 
have political roots."62 Wise, through his nai've brand of anti-ration-
alism, would narrow even further the universe of political solutions 
to the problems of public education. 
How can Dr. Wise's proffered solution be so wide of the mark? 
Perhaps it is because he seems to have no understanding Of the etiol-
ogy of the movement toward more law and procedures in the gov-
ernance of public schools. For Wise, those who advocate reform 
policies are very much like the activist Supreme Court Justice in 
Walter Murphy's The Vicar of Christ: "He simply - and totally -
disbelieved in law. To him law was not man's groping toward gen-
eral principles upon which to build a better society, but a means to 
achieve, and instantly, the particular social reform that was that day 
61. Cohen & Farrar, Power to the Parents? - The Story ef Education Vouchers, 48 Pua. 
INTEREST 72, 92 (1977). 
62. Id. 
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troubling his new-found conscience."63 Legalization and rationali• 
zation strike like lightning as reformers and those in favor of in• 
creased accountability, productivity, and equity press their claims on 
schools through the legislative and judicial processes. But why have 
they chosen to assert such claims at this time? Have not such de• 
mands existed for more than a hundred years? How does one ac• 
count for popularly elected legislatures moving in this direction -
along with federal and state judges? The answer lies, I believe, in 
the increased distrust of school authorities in the post• World War II 
era. If school officials may not be trusted to exercise properly their 
discretion, then legal rules and procedures may be adopted as means 
of constraining that discretion. 
The distrust of officialdom may have many causes, and some 
may lie outside the public school setting.64 Part of it may have to do 
with the equality revolution and the revolution of rising expecta• 
tions. As particular groups demand equal treatment and as people 
demand that government satisfy more of their wants, inevitably the 
public service products of government come in for greater scrutiny. 
The trend is reinforced by inflation and other economic problems 
that make taxpayers more wary of public services. The questions of 
accountability and bang for the buck come to the fore as people ask 
whether the public or the private sector can most efficiently satisfy 
their wants. Thus, it is no longer enough for government to provide 
more police officers, teachers, and social workers; rather, people wish 
to know whether crime rates will be reduced, whether learning will 
improve, and whether family problems are being solved. 
Under these circumstances, the legalization process can be un• 
derstood as an attempt to reinforce weakening authority links in the 
governing process. Legalization is a response to the crisis of legiti• 
macy, an attempt to make decisions appear legitimate by reaching 
them through the appropriate formal processes. Legitimacy through 
democratic consensus and expertise are perceived as failing. Fur• 
ther, legalization may be perceived as an attempt to reestablish a 
sense of community by requiring a discourse among the governors 
and the governed. The intimacy of face-to-face relations is often lost 
as the population and the public sector expand, as decision making 
becomes increasingly bureaucratized and centralized, and as power 
flows from traditional mediating institutions such as families, 
churches, and interest groups. The paradox, however, is that a com-
63. W. MURPHY, THE VICAR OF CHRIST 147 (1979). 
64. Much of the concluding discussion is taken from Yudof, supra note 22. 
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pelled intimacy through legal processes appears to be the very an-
tithesis of a community of shared values. The more reliance that is 
placed on legal processes, the more difficult it may be to achieve a 
true sense of community in which public officials are trusted to make 
decisions consistent with prevailing social, political, and economic 
norms. 
There are a few specific factors that may contribute to the dis-
trust-legalization-distrust cycle in public education. First, student 
tests scores have declined, and studies have questioned the effective-
ness of pouring additional resources into public schools. Second, the 
"equality revolution" and the "revolution of rising expectations" 
have reinforced the notion that public schools should not only edu-
cate, but also provide the means for socioeconomic advancement. 
Public schools rarely can keep up with such rising expectations. 
Third, as the school population levels off and fertility declines, fewer 
adults have children in the public schools. Adults who receive no 
direct benefit from public schools may be more critical of the per-
formance of those institutions. This distrust may be reinforced by 
sharply increasing local and state tax burdens and by the rise of 
more militant teacher organizations. Finally, the civil rights move-
ment, the failure of many Great Society social programs, and a 
growing anti-professional bias may also contribute to the decline in 
public trust in public schools. 
In the end, public schools will not be very joyous places unless 
some balance is achieved between rule and discretion. They will 
"reflect an increasingly anomic world in which private entitlement 
backed by formal procedure apparently arises to fill a vacuum left by 
the withering of that certain spirit we may call community."65 
Nonformalism is premised on trust, and trust is what is lacking in 
the school environment. But despite Wise's diagnosis, formalism did 
not create that mistrust in the first instance: it is merely a manifesta-
tion of the underlying lack of community. The reestablishment of 
trust is a precondition to the establishment of informal structures. 
And because Wise fails to identify this problem, his solutions are 
unlikely to resolve it. 
65. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural .Due Process, in NOMOS 
XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126, 149 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977). 
